Qualitative research is entirely an operation with language, in language, and occasionally on language. This article suggests a tension between theoretical recognition of a multiplicity of human experience on one hand and a reliance upon practices of thematic representation that prioritize the common or the general over individualized experience. The fulcrum of this tension is the nature of language itself and its role in human experience and meaning-making. This article sets out the theoretical foundations of Hermeneutic Constructivism as one proposed approach to redress this problematic within many qualitative frameworks and open up an opportunity for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of human being. Within Hermeneutic Constructivism, a Fundamental Postulate and 11 elaborative corollaries detail a cogent relationship between language and the structures and processes of mental activity that support the human comportment toward understanding. The authors argue that this theoretical position is able to inform a model for qualitative research that makes possible an exploration of a person's experience at a deeper level of abstraction and that may provide an avenue for overcoming this identified tension.
Introduction
Qualitative research was born out of a recognition that each individual experiences the world in fundamentally idiosyncratic ways. A long-standing disenchantment with the failure of quantitative research to capture these unique elements of experiences, and the lives, thoughts, and feelings of the individuals being explored, heralded a need to move toward a different suite of theoretical foundations to underpin the discipline of qualitative research. Thus, over many decades, qualitative research has drawn on the works of distinguished thinkers from disparate disciplines to inform an ever-developing philosophical foundation for unpacking the rich and compelling insights into the real worlds, experiences, and perspectives of individuals' lives. Despite the rich tapestry of philosophical thought that qualitative research draws attention to, the authors here argue for the existence of an essential tension between ensuring consistency with these philosophical foundations on one hand and the currency of the representation of the deeply nuanced experiences of individuals by way of thematic approaches foregrounded against a search for the general, or the common on the other. This article seeks to provide one possible alternative framework for conceptualizing and capturing the experience of individuals and in so doing provide a redress for the identified tension.
1

The Tension
Beginning from a recognition that each individual experiences the world in individually nuanced ways, the most basic consideration for a researcher has to do with providing a theoretical account of the relationship between "the individual" and "the world" or "reality." Given that qualitative research is, however, entirely an operation with language or in language, and occasionally on language, a researcher stands in need of a theoretical framework of the relationship between "the individual," "the world," and "language" that unravels the connection between the individual's experience of the world and the role that language plays within that. What is more, it is tantamount that the connection between an individual's experience and what is subsequently articulated in the dialogue of research is made clear.
One may well ask why are the unraveling of the connections between "the individual," "the world," or "reality" of any relevance to the qualitative endeavor? If the connections between the words and phrases uttered by the participants are not tied theoretically to the experiences of those individuals, then qualitative research is open to the charge of providing little more than sheer relativism. Of equal importance here is to ensure that these same theoretical connections can be traced throughout the endeavor of understanding. Therefore, if we assume-as obligated by the qualitative paradigm-that each individual experiences the world in unique ways and that language plays a central role in shaping his or her experience in ways that can then be shared with another person without a loss of meaning, then we require a theoretical account of language that embodies both the shared and finite nature of language, while acknowledging the possibility of nuanced and infinite experiences by way of that very same language.
2 It is the nature of language upon which the suggested tension pivots and as such a closer look at language itself is useful. Taylor (1985) -concerned specifically with theories of meaning and, by extension, theories about the fundamental nature of language-offers two accounts of language: the "expressive" and the "designative," which provide a useful model for unpacking the nuances of the tension we are establishing.
Accounting for Language
For Taylor (1985) , expressive accounts detail language as being constitutive of thought and subsequently disclosive of the world. 3 Expressive accounts maintain that meaning cannot be separated from the language that conditions it because meaning is only manifest within language. Language is public under this framework; the carriage of meaning in language cannot be known outside of the expression of this meaning in dialogue (even if it is a dialogue with the Self). This is emphasized by Taylor (1985) in the following passage:
The meaning of an expression cannot be explained by its being related to something else, but only by another expression. Consequently, the method of isolating terms and tracing correlations cannot work for expressive meaning . . . expression is the power of a subject; and expressions manifest things, and hence essentially refer us to subjects for whom these things can be manifest. And as I said above, what expression manifests can only be made manifest in expression, so that expressive meaning cannot be accounted for independently of expression. (p. 221) Expressive accounts therefore depict language as always being more than simply what is said. In Taylor's (1985) words, language is "always more than we can encompass; it is in a sense inexhaustible" (p. 231). This means that an expressive view accounts for language disclosing a view of the world that can be made manifest only in expression. For expressivist thinkers, language is the medium within and through which human experience transpires and allows a thing to be understood or come to meaning. Language, in this sense, is consubstantial with human being itself (Taylor, 1985) .
Designative theories of language unsurprisingly make the idea of designation fundamental. This tradition holds that language as utterance and inscription makes sense because at some level they represent and stand for something in the world, or represent something to the mind (Lawn, 2004) . To say that language represents something here is to suggest that it points to something, that a word is merely a cipher or a sign for something in the world. In this conception, words are considered meaningful as a function of their association with the thing for which they stand proxy. At the heart of the designative account is a belief that each of us is able to capture phenomena by appealing to the way that words mean what they designate and therefore provide an accurate and unambiguous representation of the way things are. These things include states of mind or thoughts. If language is simply an instrument of thought-that is, that it signifies or designates it-then thought must occur prior to language itself. This raises the question, "What then is thought?" For the designative thinker, thought must be wordless, until converted into signs and thus into meaning accessible to the mind (Lawn, 2004) . This instrumentalist view of language overlooks all of the subject-related properties upheld by an expressive account.
Designative theories therefore account for meaning itself as something unambiguous and straightforward. Of course, this is a great part of their appeal. When the meaning of words or sentences is explained by the relation of these signs to bits of the world, then, in principle, it is possible to establish objectivity. Such a conception offers the promise of a theory of language that is able to fit within the canon of modern natural science. However, Lawn (2004) suggests that in designative accounts of language, "questions about the actuality of language are quickly overshadowed or forgotten. The diverse and extensive nature of language is overlooked and a limited concentration upon the dubious belief that language discloses states of mind neglects the phenomena of language" (p. 9). As we will demonstrate below, the core of the tension we are elaborating is perhaps best described as a slippage between expressive ideas of language that provide the theoretical underpinning of unique individual experience and the designative account of language obligated by thematic approaches to representation. Holloway and Todres (2003) identify "thematizing meaning" as one of the few generic skills informing all forms of qualitative analysis (p. 347). Similarly, Braun and Clarke (2006) also recognize that much of qualitative research analysis is essentially thematic in nature, and they go on to suggest that even where a different approach to analysis has been identified-or even where no approach is identified at all-the hallmarks of a thematic approach can be recognized. In placing thematic analysis-or something very much like it-at the center of the qualitative endeavor more broadly, these authors support a closer examination of mechanism of thematic analysis that will in turn progressively illuminate the nuances of the designative versus expressive tension under consideration by this article.
Thematic Representation
Exploring the most frequent approaches utilized for the conduct of thematic analysis as identified by Shin, Kim, and Chung (2009 )-see Colaizzi (1978 ), van Manen (1990 , Giorgi (1985) , and Smith (1996) -as well as those highlighted in a more recent and increasingly utilized text by Braun and Clarke (2013) , we uncover a series of surprisingly consistent internal processes that appear to obligate a subscription to designative assumptions about language. Each scholar suggests that the researcher make determinations of the meaning embedded within aspects of the interview material that he or she deems to be significant. More specifically, Colaizzi (1978) suggests the researcher extract "significant statements" and then draw meaning from them, while Giorgi (1985) proposes that the researcher "create units of meaning by intuitively making sense of the data." van Manen (1990) requires, in turn, that the researcher "compose linguistic transformations" and thereby transform the words of the participants into more meaningful or sensitive paragraphs, and Smith (1996) uses the word "theme" to identify the process of locating significant material for analysis. Braun and Clarke (2013) suggest that the researcher engage in a process of "coding" whereby one identifies the essence of a piece of data that interests the researcher and articulates it in such a way that it is able to stand alone from the data.
Despite subtle variations, the adherence to a designative view of language and the subsequent idea that meaning is somehow transparent is ever present. Suggesting that the researcher is able to identify those aspects of the participants' dialogue that are meaningful, as well as what it is that the participant really meant by those statements, raises questions about the extent to which the experience of the individuals involved is indeed being represented. Raising a similar question, Fine (2002) argues that the "giving voice" approach to qualitative research "involves carving out unacknowledged pieces of narrative evidence that we select, edit, and deploy to border our arguments" (p. 218). Kvale (2006) , however, best highlights the fundamental issue being raised here:
In social science research, the interviewer generally upholds a monopoly of interpretation over the interviewee's statements . . . the research interviewer as the "big interpreter," maintains exclusive privilege to interpret and report what the interviewee really meant and to frame what an interviewee says in his or her own theoretical schemes. (p. 485) The authors suggest that to assume the role of imbuing the words of the participant with what he or she "really meant," or to "give voice" to the participant, the researcher must assume a designative view of language. In addition, suggesting that the researcher uncover or intuit the meanings that are assumed to be embedded within the words of a participant-often in the absence of any real-time dialogue with the participant-and that these meanings can then be amalgamated (Giorgi, 1985) , clumped, or clustered (Colaizzi, 1978) to produce as complete a representation as possible of the experience of the individual participants involved is problematic.
While a definition of what a theme is remains elusive (Braun & Clarke, 2013 ), at the most basic level, every thematic approach is underpinned by a search for those aspects of experience that are considered by the researcher as common or general to the individuals' lives and experiences being explored. Arguably, a theme represents a "zooming-out" from the inherently unique elements of individual experience-garnered during the dialogical experience with that individual-to those more general aspects that the researcher identifies across the group of individuals. Themes, by definition, represent a loss of attention to detail, a loss of the idiosyncratic.
Synthesis of the Tension
Beginning, therefore, from a position that idiosyncrasy in experience is the mode of being of human life itself, we propose the expressivist account of language as most appropriate for the purposes of qualitative research. The expressivist position accounts for a finite shared language as the medium that conditions our experience of the world. Despite the finite nature of the words and phrases that can be uttered, this medium allows each of us infinitely nuanced experience, the meaning of which can then be shared through dialogue with others. In terms of qualitative research, we suggest that expressivist ideas provide the most compelling foundation to account for the indissoluble nexus between "the individual," "the world" or "reality," and "language." In application, the dialogical opportunity that we have with the participantwhich we contend is fundamentally expressive in nature-allows us to come as close as possible to the individual's experience.
Herein lies the tension, which is perhaps best couched as a question: How do we bring together the interests of a theoretical position that places at the center the multiplicity/individual-the fundamentally expressive-aspects of human experience in language by way of a methodology that is foregrounded against a search for the designative/common? The authors suggest that the "slippage" between the expressivist and designative accounts of language represented in this tension overlook the essential role of language in-between experience and meaning, and in so doing undermine the capacity of qualitative research to represent people and experience at a deeply nuanced level of abstraction. Essentially, the authors argue that thematic approaches to representation that pervade qualitative research tend to overlook the fundamentally disclosive nature of language and in so doing delimit the human potentiality of understanding the world in idiosyncratic ways (Peck, 2015) . This both robs language of its inherently expressive qualities, and the participant of having his or her "what it is like for me" characteristics of human experience, represented by qualitative research.
As one possible response to this problematic, this article proposes Hermeneutic Constructivism, 4 a theoretical framework developed by the authors, which they consider able to redress these deficits. While the primary elements of this approach will be examined in detail throughout this article, in summary, Hermeneutic Constructivism is a theoretical framework able to inform qualitative inquiry through its support of a deep dialogical engagement with the psychologically proactive individual that we ourselves all are. In particular, Hermeneutic Constructivism seeks the abstraction of understanding at the level of the psychological structures that condition the inner qualities of human experience-qualia-with the world and one's own Self. Contemplating the individual at this level of idiosyncratic abstraction-and remaining consistent with expressivist principles of the nature of language-Hermeneutic Constructivism overcomes the problematic manifest in thematic analysis and may offer a considered means of addressing the tension identified here. Following the course of Kelly's (1955) elaboration of his own theoretical work-The Psychology of Personal Constructs-which informs our approach, Hermeneutic Constructivism will be outlined by way of a Fundamental Postulate augmented through 11 elaborative corollaries. These together represent the overarching theoretical position. This article will culminate with a speculative consideration of the possible operationalization and utility of Hermeneutic Constructivism for providing a nuanced and more idiographic understanding and representation of human being for qualitative research.
Core Principles of Hermeneutic Constructivism
The suggestion here is that the theoretical principles that underpin the notion of the "inner outlook" embodied by Kelly's (1955) Personal Construct Psychology find substantive parallels with the qualitative endeavor we envisage. The idiographic core of Kelly's (1955) work, and the high level of theoretical abstraction with which he suggests we are able to understand ourselves and others, offers fertile ground for our theoretical endeavor. The way in which Kelly (1955) accounts for language, its inextricability with thought, and our experience of the world, also lead us to look for alternative and arguably more sophisticated accounts of the nature of language as a condition of human being. It is here that we have turned toward the hermeneutic work of Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 , which offers a cogent response to limitations identified in the way Kelly (1955) dealt with the role of language in the construction of the world and of the Self (Chiari & Nuzzo, 2004 , 2010 Leman, 1970; Peck, 2015) . Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 locates language as "the universal medium within which understanding occurs" (p. 389) and, in so doing, argues that language is therefore not an obstacle to be overcome in understanding. Instead, it is the very condition of being itself. Hermeneutic Constructivism can be considered a reenvisioning of these two sets of core insights and, as such, it is possible to read many of the philosophical principles of Kelly's (1955) and Gadamer's (1960 Gadamer's ( /2003 work between the lines of Hermeneutic Constructivism.
5 Principles integral to Hermeneutic Constructivism are delineated below, particularly those specifying the relations between the world, language, human experience, and the individual.
The World
Hermeneutic Constructivism begins from the position that human experience is always experience of something; it is always experience of the world. The world-to paraphrase Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 )-does exist independently of human affairs. In addition, at any one moment in time, there are innumerable happenings throughout the world. Each person will never come to appreciate all of these for the simple fact that, at any single moment in time, we cannot direct our gaze toward each and every happening. Instead, only those aspects that we can apprehend and appreciate are those toward which we direct our understanding processes. Those aspects of the world that we direct our understanding processes toward are, for Hermeneutic Constructivism, termed events. Hermeneutic Constructivism takes the view that the fundamental comportment or attitude toward the world that each person adopts is one of understanding. In other words, each of us seeks or is rather compelled to understand the world in order to go about within the world. Understanding, however, is not an understanding of things in themselves in terms of a perfection of understanding; it is rather an understanding of the thing of itself, as an understanding of that thing as it for us. This is an understanding that is sufficient to go on with being human, to go on with the world. Therefore, if the comportment of being is toward understanding, and those aspects of the world that we reach toward in understanding are events, then being itself is an active movement on the part of the person that can be embodied in terms of a being situated within a stream of events.
Person the Languager
Accepting the view of language established by Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 , Hermeneutic Constructivism acknowledges that language is more than merely an instrument for working on the world; instead, it is the medium of being human, not in terms of restriction to the possibilities of human understanding, but rather as its very condition. The person envisaged here does not have an experience and then name it; instead, it is always within and through language that we each come to understand and experience the world. It is therefore language that nourishes and sustains our ongoing movement of being human. The person that Hermeneutic Constructivism is concerned with is not Person the Bystander, or Person the Pointer to Things, but rather Person the Languager. This is no trivial label. Instead, it represents the fundamental assumption that informs Hermeneutic Constructivism. In fact, from here on, each individual person is thought of in terms of "Person the Languager," a person who through and within the medium of language comes to experience and understand the world in such a way that there can be no separation between the world and his or her experience of it. So much is this the case that the psychological processes of "You the Languager" are indissoluble from the medium of language. This means that having an experience is itself not different from the way in which it can be brought to language, making "You the Languager's" relation to the world primordially linguistic and hence intelligible. In particular, it is a dialogic relation. To go on with the setting down of the Hermeneutic Constructivist position, a brief sketch of the way each person engages in a dialogue with the world is necessary.
A dialogue between two people is easy to conceive of. The world itself, however, cannot speak, and therefore engaging in a dialogue with it is less straightforward to comprehend. Here, Gadamer's (1960 Gadamer's ( /2003 consideration of I-Thou relationships is recalled. 6 For Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 , the I encompasses all that is the Self. It is the culmination of our historicity as that something that we have made of things within the world in previous ventures of understanding. This I therefore represents all that we bring with us to an event of understanding, and embodies the possibilities that we have available to us in an event of understanding. A Thou on the other hand is all that is other; not simply in terms of objects themselves, but rather in terms of the way in which things in the world are able to have a relation with the I. That is, the I makes the thing to be understood come to understanding in such a way that it can relate to the I through a dialogue as a Thou. For this to occur, the I asks questions of the thing to be understood. In so doing, the thing is then able to relate to the I. Here, then, a thing becomes a Thou and relates to the I by providing answers to the questions asked of it. The complexity of this relationship lends itself to an exemplar.
Love is, of course, a highly charged and contested term within psychological and philosophical literature. However, here love is used as an example of an emotion that at first can be difficult to apprehend in understanding and yet, over time and through continued dialogical engagement, comes to be understood as such. The example of love also provides an opportunity to explore the way in which many of the Corollaries of Hermeneutic Constructivism "play out" in a foreseeably common context, an exploration to be carried out below. The first time someone is in love, he or she may not understand that something that is clearly happening to them. The constantly intrusive thoughts about someone else and the overwhelmingly positive emotion may be outside of anything experienced before and therefore cannot easily be understood. Initially, it is conceivable that an understanding of these sensations, as an overwhelmingly positive emotion, is all that the person has available to him or her to make sense of what is going on in the here and now. However, in the excitement of coming to know better what it is that is going on, that person begins to ask questions. These questions originate from the I and are directed at the emotion. The questions make the emotion become a Thou that in turn provides answers to these questions.
After a to and fro dialogue between I and the emotion as a Thou, the person may arrive at the joyful conclusion that this feeling must be love. Here, the circularity of question and answer, from I to Thou and back again as captured by this exemplar, is the way in which the Thou relates to the I and ultimately comes to change the I for future experience. In other words, the understanding of the emotion as an initially overwhelmingly positive emotion that then comes to be understood as love becomes a part of the I in that it becomes a part of the person's repertoire of understanding in the future. Thus, in setting down the theoretical foundation of Hermeneutic Constructivism, the term dialogue not only relates to what goes on between people but also, through the notion of I-Thou, represents that which also goes on between the person and his or her experience of the world.
The Prejudice
Hermeneutic Constructivism takes the view that within and through language, as dialogue, people develop for themselves a series of historically mediated, anticipatory, and languaged structures through which the world comes to be meaningfully understood. Following Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 , these structures are referred to as prejudices. A prejudice here is not to be confused with its common meaning as a false or irrational thought or as a bias against a thing. Rather, it is understood in its original meaning, rehabilitated by Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 , as a judgment rendered before all available elements for consideration have been finally examined. The prejudice is thus not a structure of human understanding that restricts the possibilities of understanding. Instead, we always project a prejudice toward the world in understanding and through a dialogue make the world respond-as a Thou-to the questions asked of it. When projected toward an aspect of the world or an event of understanding, a person may find, however, that a prejudice is less able to adequately bring that event to satisfactory understanding. Although a prejudice may be found to provide an inadequate understanding and therefore stand in need of development, the prejudice structure is itself an inextricable precondition of understanding. All understanding originates entirely in the light provided by a person's prejudices.
The prejudice is therefore a temporal and yet essential precondition of understanding that represents the initial position from which an understanding originates. Through projection of a prejudice toward an event, a person also determines the adequacy of that prejudice and dialogically adjusts that prejudice in the direction of the possibilities opened up through questioning. Thus, at its core, the business of being human refers to the projection (and adjustment) of a prejudice toward the world-as an event-so as to satisfactorily understand the world to go on being in the world. Inherent within this conceptualization of the prejudice is a comportment to find ever better ways of anticipating the world. These issues are clarified further below.
Fundamental Postulate and Elaborative Corollaries
For Kelly (1955) , the most basic statement of a theoretical position is the Fundamental Postulate. This is a statement that is considered basic to all of the theoretical elements that it supports and which provides a tentative proposal from which to begin. Kelly (1955) believes that it is easy for us to pose questions of a postulate, but asks that we recognize that these questions are in fact arising from a different set of assumptions to those embodied by the postulate itself. Consistent with the way in which Kelly (1955) set down his Personal Construct Psychology, we begin our delineation of Hermeneutic Constructivism with an overarching statement, followed by an explanatory consideration.
Fundamental Postulate
A Person's understanding processes are guided by his or her languaging of events.
As captured by the notion of Person the Languager, language is for Hermeneutic Constructivism the condition of human understanding. A cognitive exercise outlined by Wittgenstein (1968) is useful to highlight the inseparability of mental activities from language.
Point to a piece of paper.-And now point to its shape-now to its colour-now to its number (that sounds queer).-How did you do it?-You will say that you meant a different thing each time you pointed. And if I ask how that is done, you will say you concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape etc. But I ask again: how is that done? (p. 16) Here, Wittgenstein highlights that the action of merely pointing is the same behavior each time and therefore the action alone cannot carry different meanings. The same problem arises when a person believes that he or she points to each of these elements mentally. In fact, in each situation, the movement of pointing requires some expression of what we are meaning each time and cannot therefore occur in the absence of language. Wittgenstein's cognitive experiment highlights that language is indeed the medium through which the world comes to be understood, making language the medium of a person's understanding processes.
Under this framework, several additional points need to be made. First is to stress that the subject matter of focus is the understanding processes of the person, meaning first and foremost the individual person. It is also suggested that understanding is the totality of what a person can bring to language-at any given moment-about a thing that is to be understood. In other words, if we were to ask another person to tell us about something, then what he or she could bring to language on the subject matter represents what that person understands about that something. Conceived in this way, understanding is therefore that something that a person already has; it is that something that is required for that person to go on in the world.
The notion of understanding as the human comportment that is implicit in this conceptualization of understanding itself becomes clearer when considered in reverse. In the absence of a sufficient understanding, the world appears as little more than an indefinable and overwhelmingly ambiguous array of sensory input. Having established that understanding is the comportment of being, the nature of this understanding can be elaborated further.
The prejudice has already been described as a historically mediated structure. That is, it embodies what a person has made of time-past and now uses to project toward time-present to bring it to understanding. Through the I-Thou dialogue outlined above, this initial prejudice has the possibility of evolving through the dialogue of question and answer. Although, at the end of this dialogue, a sufficient understanding is achieved for a person to go on being in the world, this understanding always has the possibility of becoming a different or better understanding than the initial prejudice that was projected. In turn, if the I embodies the totality of that something that we already have about a thing, and simultaneously conditions the dialogue of I-Thou, it follows that what we come to understand better or differently through the I-Thou dialogue is in fact the I. With this in mind, the nature of the I can now be elucidated further. The I is conditioned by our prejudices as the culmination of that something that we have made of the events of time-past. If the prejudice is the essential condition of the I, then it is in fact the prejudice itself that is developed through the dialogue of I-Thou. This notion of the I is for Hermeneutic Constructivism synonymous with the Self. This is because the I is the totality of our prejudices or those structures that determine our understanding processes. It is therefore the foundation of our highly nuanced understanding of the world, and what makes us who we are as individual people. Achieving a greater understanding of a person's prejudices is to understand that person at the level of the Self.
Specific stress needs to be applied with regard to other terms in the Fundamental Postulate. For instance, the use of processes within the fundamental postulate emphasizes that understanding is always an active process on the part of the person who wishes to understand. Given that all understanding originates from the prejudice(s) that we project toward the world, the person that Hermeneutic Constructivism concerns itself with is considered to be fundamentally proactive when it comes to understanding. At the same time, to be guided is to be directed or influenced regarding the course of action that is taken. This is to emphasize that a person's understanding processes are always under the direct influence of or follow already established pathways. Remaining consistent with the idea that a prejudice is an anticipatory structure from which all understanding originates, these same structures exert an influence over or guide the process of understanding. Despite being synonymous with a person's prejudices, and therefore open to ongoing revision, these guides are fundamentally ontological in nature.
As has already been noted, Hermeneutic Constructivism takes the view that language is the medium through which the world comes to understanding. Here, there is no separation envisaged between the thing to be understood and the way in which the person brings it into language; it is the coming into language of the thing itself. This consideration allows us to unravel further what is meant by the notion of meaning and its relation to understanding. Understanding represents that something that has been previously made of an event. As such, it also represents the initial possibilities that are available to a person from which to begin a dialogue toward understanding in the future. The notion of meaning, however, represents what it is that goes on in making something of the world. That is, meaning is the term given to the dialogical to and fro movement of making a determination of the appropriateness of an understanding. This determination is not the seeking of a correspondence between a prejudice and the thing to be understood; rather, it is a consideration of the degree to which an understanding is satisfactory or sufficient for the person to go on with the world. Meaning is therefore the dialogue of I-Thou itself. It is the working out of how well an understanding that a person already has is able to satisfactorily bring to understanding a specific event toward which his or her understanding processes are directed. To return to the exemplar of a first love, the movement of coming to this understanding also involves a process of meaning-making.
Not having any previous experience of these things that are clearly happening, a person begins from an initial prejudice that might be overwhelmingly positive emotion. Through languaging the meaning of this initial prejudice, he or she is able to determine the satisfactory "fit" of the prejudice with the emotion. Here the person might come to recognize, through the dialogue of I-Thou, that the emotion itself is far more than simply a positive emotion. In so doing, the person would develop a greater appreciation of the limitations or the meaning of his or her initial prejudice. This process of developing meaning is simultaneously the process of modifying the prejudice. From the initial position of overwhelming positive emotion and the process of seeking meaning of it, the person might develop his or her prejudice to it is more than just being happy, it is being complete, and even further to the prejudice this must be love.
The space in between each of the prejudices in this example embodies that space within which a process of establishing meaning goes on. In other words, meaning is making a determination of how well the initial understanding is sufficient to go on with being. With this in mind, meaning can be thought of less in terms of understanding per se, and more in terms of what goes on in the to and fro dialogue of the I-Thou relationship. It is this movement that ultimately conditions and sustains understanding itself. This greater appreciation of the notion of meaning sheds more light on the notion of understanding. Understanding is therefore the culmination or the outcome of these ongoing meaning-making ventures of being human. Understanding as the fundamental comportment of being is therefore conditioned by meaning.
Having considered the inextricable immixture of understanding and meaning, a return can now be made to the consideration of languaging. Recall that languaging is what goes on within the comportment of being. At the core of languaging is a recognition of the historicity that is present in all understanding. In other words, languaging is a consideration of the way that time-past and timepresent always coalesce in understanding. Here time-present represents the evanescent or fleeting aspects of our existence; it relates to the "here and now" characteristics of being in the world. Time-past, however, is the culmination of these evanesced "here and nows." Consistent with the assumed proactivity of the person, this notion of culmination is not to be confused with the accumulation of a person's "here and nows." Instead, time-past is the culmination of what we have actively made of the "here and nows" toward which we direct our understanding processes. Further examination of this fundamental postulate through its corollaries will emphasize that time-past is not simply a limitation or obstacle to understanding, being rather an essential precondition of understanding in time-present. A return to the example of a first love is again useful. The initial understanding as an overwhelming positive emotion represents the best that this person could bring to the event of understanding. It is the culmination of what he or she has made of previous here and nows, representative of this person's time-past. This carrying forward of time-past to future or time-present events of understanding epitomizes the centrality of historicity for Hermeneutic Constructivism.
One could be mistaken for assuming that it is possible for the person conceived here to set down the entirety of his or her historicity or time-past. That is, to bring to language everything that he or she has made of the here and nows that have passed. However, those aspects of timepast that we can access are determined by the prejudice from which we project an understanding toward the world. While a lot more could be said about how our understanding processes are constantly affected by our historicity, it is enough at this point to note that Hermeneutic Constructivism accepts that it is a person's prejudices that provides a conduit to his or her historicity. Thus, in the movement of languaging, we progressively open up or gain access to more aspects of our historicity. To explore this idea further, the first love example is again potent.
Beginning again with the prejudice overwhelming positive emotion, this person may ask questions of that emotion to understand it better. In so doing, he or she is ultimately determining the meaning or the fit of the prejudice to the emotion itself. It is possible that this person might ask the following question of his or her emotion, "Is it like winning the soccer final?" In posing this question, the person opens up a different aspect of his or her historicity, meaning that those aspects of historicity that this prejudice opens up toward can also now contribute to the ongoing I-Thou dialogue. The soccer final may indeed be a positive emotion-in terms of feeling a part of a successful team, a sense of camaraderie-but not, one would presume, in the same way as this overwhelming positive emotion. Thus, through the continued questioning dialogue of languaging, this person may gain access to more aspects of his or her historicity. These aspects of historicity that are opened continue to provide the person with further and varied aspects of understanding that sustain the dialogue of languaging and therefore the development of a different understanding.
In summary, languaging embodies the interpenetration of time-past into time-present in all understanding. At its core, languaging apprehends the way that the comportment of being toward understanding is fundamentally linguistic in nature. The person envisaged here is therefore able to be articulate about the qualities of his or her innermost experiences. The coming into language of these qualities of experience, or qualia, is not a special kind of understanding. Instead, this coming into language is the very condition of qualia itself.
Elaborative Corollaries
The Fundamental Postulate has established that the person of Hermeneutic Constructivism is a proactive, languaging constitutor of the world that he or she comes to understand. The following 11 corollaries are considered to logically follow from and augment this Fundamental Postulate. Again, each statement of a corollary is followed by an explanatory consideration.
Prejudice Corollary-A person develops dialogi-
cally a series of anticipatory prejudices that guide his or her languaging processes.
The unpacking of the concept of languaging thus far could be considered to be little more than a form of unwieldy relativism. This would be a position where a person simply brings the world to understanding in the way he or she envisages as appropriate from moment to moment. However, we must recall that it is the prejudice itself that provides the spectrum within which the movement of languaging is ultimately determined. That is, the established pathways or guides that our prejudices provide operate to control our understanding processes. The human comportment toward understanding is therefore not a simple "anything goes" relativism; instead, it is determined by the possibilities that our prejudices provide as fundamentally historical structures. It is therefore always the prejudice that provides the light by which the world is illuminated. In fact, it is the prejudice that allows human being to have a world at all. As this corollary also makes clear, it is the prejudice that provides entrée to the dialogue of languaging as well as sustaining the dialogue itself. This is because the prejudice ultimately determines those aspects of a dialogue that can become meaningful. For example, if one was to attempt to make sense of a shape that appeared within the water while swimming at the beach, the prejudice not all fish are threatening would not meaningfully allow a dialogue concerning a nearby picnic spot to ensue with a fellow swimmer. Although a dialogue always originates from a prejudice, it is the dialogue itself that simultaneously conditions the ongoing development of the prejudice. Therefore, the initial prejudice from which the dialogue of languaging originates always has the potential to become something different. In turn, this becoming something different represents the development of a different understanding. In fact, this dialogical evolution of an initial prejudice elaborates a little further what the human comportment of being toward understanding actually is. The different or, rather, evolved prejudice itself has the potential to be the initial prejudice from which languaging begins in future events of understanding.
As previously outlined, a prejudice represents an abstraction of what has been made of time-past and at the same time conditions understanding in time-present. Thus, the prejudice is the very condition of the human comportment toward understanding and therefore of languaging itself. The prejudice is therefore an essential anticipatory prejudgment that provides entrée to the dialogue of languaging and yet, simultaneously, has its being in this same dialogue. The ontological nature of the prejudice means that the structure itself can only come to be understood in the dialogue of being. A look at the way that the prejudice sustains the dialogue of being will facilitate a deeper understanding of the prejudice itself.
There can be little doubt that language fills itself with meaning that goes well beyond simply what is said. In other words, the meaning that is embodied by a phrase is far more than the literal meaning of the words themselves. The metaphor or idiom is exemplary of this notion. The statement a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, for instance, embodies the idea that already having something, even if only small, is better than risking losing it in the pursuit of more. The language of this idiom carries with it a clear example of the inner dimension of meaning that is inherent within language. But from where does this inner dimension of meaning come from? How does the prejudice that we project toward the thing that is to be understood fill itself with meaning to sustain the dialogue of languaging?
The inner dimension of meaning of the prejudice comes from our time-past, those somethings that we have made of previous events of understanding. However, we do not simply reflect upon these understandings and then choose between them. Instead, these understandings are accessed only by our prejudices and therefore only through the dialogue of languaging. Worded another way, our prejudices effectively provide a conduit to our understanding thus far. It is therefore those aspects of our timepast, ultimately our historicity, that are accessed by a specific prejudice that operates to fill that prejudice, and therefore the dialogue of languaging, with meaning. It is this concept of filling itself with meaning that allows the prejudice to establish and maintain the I-Thou dialogue of languaging. It follows that if being is the movement toward understanding, then the direction of languaging is always toward the evolution of the initial prejudice. That is, languaging is always directed toward a different or better understanding through which to illuminate an event in the future.
The discussion thus far has progressively elaborated the notion of the prejudice as a fundamental and inextricable precondition of understanding. In light of this, the way in which Hermeneutic Constructivism conceptualizes qualia, as the qualities of our internal experience, can now be unpacked further. Enough has been said up to this point to be clear that experience requires proactivity on the part of the experiencing person. This proactivity has as its condition the projection of a prejudice or initial understanding toward the thing that is to be understood. As established above, all understanding occurs entirely in the light of a prejudice. This is not different when the thing that is to be understood is our internal understanding processes. It follows, therefore, that if qualia are the qualities of our internal experience, then they too are conditioned by our prejudices.
2. Horizon Corollary-Each prejudice provides the horizon within which a thing to be understood can meaningfully come to understanding.
Enough has been said at this point to be clear that the prejudice is determinate of the possibilities of the way that the world can come to understanding through the dialogue of languaging. This corollary is recognition that each prejudice carries with it a horizon. The notion of a horizon here embodies what it is that can be illuminated and therefore seen from a particular vantage point or prejudice. In other words, this corollary establishes that each prejudice is only able to illuminate or provide understanding to a finite number of events. What, however, is important to note here is that each prejudice has its own horizon of understanding. Each person is free to move within the spectrum of the horizon that a single prejudice provides. Equally, through the dialogue of languaging, a person can also move into the horizon of a different prejudice to achieve a different perspective or to project a different light upon that event that is to be understood. This is to reinstate Gadamer's (1960 Gadamer's ( /2003 notion of a horizon, meaning all that is available to be envisaged from a particular vantage point. For Hermeneutic Constructivism, the horizon represents the totality of those aspects of the thing that can meaningfully come to understanding from the vantage point of a particular prejudice. The horizon of the prejudice is the embodiment of everything that one already has about the thing to be understood that can be accessed by that prejudice. In line with this, as the prejudice itself is developed or evolves, so too does its horizon or those aspects of time-past that it provides access to. Up to this point, the term time-past has been used to capture that something a person has made of his or her understanding processes in previous here and nows. However, a more focused consideration of the prejudice requires more precise language. Thus, from here on, those aspects that we already have about the thing to be understood are referred to as authentic consciousness. This term represents more effectively the historical effect that the comportment toward being has and the way in which we are affected at every moment in the present comportment by that something that we have made of past here and nows. To be more precise, a horizon represents that aspect of authentic consciousness to which the prejudice provides access. This is a reminder that a horizon is not a fixed position from which human understanding originates. Rather, it exists as a spectrum that carries possibilities of understanding and within which each person moves in coming to an understanding.
Antithetic Corollary-Each prejudice has an
implicit antithesis beyond which its utility is limited.
Each prejudice has a finite spectrum with which it can be considered useful for bringing the world to understanding. This spectrum constitutes what it is that can be understood from the particular vantage point of a specific prejudice; it is the horizon of the prejudice. As indicated above, the horizon of each prejudice constitutes the spectrum within which a person can move to bring a thing to understanding. Being conceptualized in terms of a spectrum, it follows that this spectrum ultimately has limits. This corollary seeks to emphasize that each prejudice is a spectrum and therefore always more than merely a single fixed position from which to illuminate the world understandingly. This spectrum consists of the prejudice that is ready at hand-Evident prejudice-and its implicit opposite, the Antithetic prejudice. In other words, each prejudice, as part of its fundamental structure, has its own Evident prejudice and Antithetic prejudice. In combination, these structures embody the context of the prejudice.
It is important to appreciate that the context of the prejudice simply represents the bipolar structure of the prejudice itself. The horizon, however, represents those aspects of authentic consciousness that can come to understanding along the spectrum or within the context of the prejudice. The horizon is therefore the totality of what can come to understanding from our authentic consciousness as that spectrum between the Evident prejudice and the Antithetic prejudice. The importance of the antithetic prejudice cannot be overlooked and is attributed to the work of Hegel (1807 Hegel ( /1967 and Kelly (1955) . Hegel (1807 Hegel ( /1967 suggested that there is no preconceived position or thesis that is devoid of an inherent antithesis, arguing that by establishing this dichotomy, of thesis-antithesis, it is possible for a person to identify sources of conflict between these two positions, and to then develop a synthesis or a means of overcoming these sources of conflict. In line with this, Kelly (1955) suggests that to understand better what a person means, we need to look at what he or she does not mean. Equally, Hermeneutic Constructivism takes the view that to better appreciate those aspects of the world that a person's prejudice can illuminate, we need to apprehend those aspects of the world that the prejudice does not illuminate. In other words, to understand the way in which a person uses an Evident prejudice to bring an event to understanding, we need to appreciate those aspects of the world that this evident prejudice cannot provide meaningful understanding to. That is, we need to gain an understanding of what the Evident prejudice is not.
Although each Evident prejudice always has the possibility of an antithesis, in the everyday use of our prejudice systems we may not in fact become aware of this Antithetic prejudice. The Organization Corollary (the fourth corollary, to be discussed next) will emphasize that in everyday understanding we simply evanesce from one Evident prejudice toward another in the comportment of being. It is for this reason that we may not find ourselves grappling with questions about our prejudices, questions that might involve such matters as what a prejudice is not. Despite this, Hermeneutic Constructivism takes the view that the antithetic nature of a prejudice is implicit within the structure of the prejudice itself. Thus, although we may not come up against these Antithetic prejudices in the comportment of being, they represent those aspects of the world that an Evident prejudice cannot illuminate and are therefore implicit within the structure of each prejudice itself.
In addition, this notion of antithesis highlights the idea that if we are able to identify those aspects of the world that we can envisage, then we are equally able to identify those aspects that we cannot envisage from the vantage point of a specific prejudice. To appreciate this, we need to first review the role of the Evident prejudice in languaging. In the comportment of being, we reach toward an event of understanding from the perspective of our Evident prejudice, the understanding that we already have and which readily comes to hand in understanding. It is from this initial position that languaging begins, as a dialogue that is itself informed at every moment by those aspects of authentic consciousness that the evident prejudice provides access to. However, those aspects of authentic consciousness that we gain access to are determined not by the Evident prejudice alone, but by the broader context of the prejudice itself. This is the point that the spectrum of the possibilities of understanding that we have available to us-from the vantage point of a specific prejudice-are located between the Evident and Antithetic prejudices.
There is a further point here; the prejudice is not in a structure reminiscent of a series of separately defined "cells." That is, we do not merely go into one cell to envision the world, and then go out of it to then go into another cell. The bounds of the prejudice are rather much less defined, and prejudices are constantly coalescing with each other. It is for this reason that during everyday dialogue we do not often find ourselves asking What now? as having reached the limits of the context of a prejudice. Instead, in everyday being, each prejudice simply evanesces into another prejudice from which further questions may spring forth, and indeed do, sustaining the dialogue of languaging. However, having established the antithetic nature of the prejudice as implicit within its structure, Hermeneutic Constructivism suggests that we can be clear about the point at which one prejudice would otherwise evanesce toward another prejudice in understanding. This is the point at which we can no longer develop meaningful questions to be asked of the thing to be understood. The antithetic nature of a prejudice therefore represents that point beyond which a prejudice's utility is limited. Worded another way, the antithetic point is the point beyond which the person can no longer develop suitable questions to be posed of the thing to be understood and is therefore the point at which this prejudice cannot suitably illuminate the thing in understanding. This is a reminder that there is always the possibility of envisioning the world differently from the vantage point of understanding that our prejudices provide at any one point.
Organization Corollary-Each prejudice becomes
an integral component of a greater dialogical system of prejudices.
It has been mentioned above that in an event of understanding, as we approach the antithetic end of the spectrum of a prejudice's context, a different prejudice arrives. This different prejudice subsequently provides access to different aspects of our authentic consciousness. In so doing, it shows how different and further questions can be asked of the thing to be understood. The Organization Corollary recognizes that in the absence of a sense of organization or lawfulness to our prejudices, we would be incapable of finding any sense of consistency in what goes on around us and, subsequently, we would not be able to bring the world to meaningful understanding. Thus, at the core of the Organization Corollary is a view that each prejudice is dialogically related to other prejudices, thereby creating a system of prejudices. It is this system from which all understanding-the comportment of being-has its origins. As such, this system represents all that we currently understand about the world as well as the possibilities that we have available to us for envisaging the world. In light of this, it is this system of prejudices that represents the Self. In fact, a person's system of prejudices represents more completely his or her Self than any single prejudice alone. This corollary is reflexive of the way in which we tend to move dialogically from an initial prejudice or understanding into the spectrum of another prejudice with a degree of consistency. Here, the use of the term degree does not mean that it is by mere happenstance that we have a tendency to reach almost the same prejudice in different instances of understanding. Instead, the term degree reflects the way in which the prejudice that we tend to evanesce toward is capable of evolving. That is, the prejudice that we evanesce toward in the movement of languaging in one instance may indeed be the same prejudice in a future instance, albeit thereby a different prejudice as a function of having evolved through the dialogue of languaging itself. In terms of the greater system of prejudices, then, when the context of the prejudice changes as a function of this evolution, so too does the utility of the prejudice and therefore the point at which it evanesces toward a different prejudice.
In maintaining a sense of reflexivity, it is important to apprehend the way in which our beliefs and values influence our understanding. Here, adopting the structure elaborated within Kelly's (1955) Psychology of Personal Constructs, Hermeneutic Constructivism elaborates the relationship between prejudices in terms of superordinacy and subordinacy. Therefore, it is suggested that a person's prejudices are situated in terms of a hierarchy, an integral relationship with superordinate prejudices exerting influence over those prejudices that are subordinate to them. Following this position, prejudices of the highest order within a person's system are core prejudices. These embody our most central values and beliefs about the world. Given the centrality of such beliefs to the ongoing stability of our everyday lives, it is these core prejudices that are most resistant to radical change.
7 It follows, therefore, that these core structures exert an influence over the evolution and development of all subsequent prejudices within a person's greater system of prejudices.
Individuality Corollary-Persons differ from each
other by the way they language their prejudices.
The fundamental postulate is clear that it is the anticipatory pathways formed by the ongoing dialogue of languaging that guide each person's understanding processes. The Individuality Corollary reaches forward from this position to emphasize the way that these anticipatory pathways-prejudices-come to language, and in so doing provide a basis for conceptualizing individual differences between people. Here, as we know, the prejudice is the embodiment of what has been made of or understood about a thing, through the dialogue of languaging. It is from the vantage point of the horizon of a prejudice that we reach toward the thing that is to be understood. Through the dialogue of languaging that is sustained by authentic consciousness, each of us is carried along in the comportment of being. Importantly, we are each carried along in a different and unique way as a function ultimately of our understanding processes-languaging. As outlined above, language carries with it a possibility of meaning that goes well beyond simply what is said. That is, language is fundamentally speculative in nature. It follows, therefore, that the fundamentally linguistic nature of our understanding processes means that each of us differ in the way in which we bring the world to language. What is more, in a situation where two people use the same language to represent an understanding, the inherently speculative nature of language means that each individual person may indeed mean something entirely different. When provided an opportunity to language further the meaning of his or her understanding, then the inherently idiosyncratic meaning embodied by the person's words is able to come to the fore. Although the Individuality Corollary is clear that each person's meaning-making processes are indeed fundamentally individual as a function of the essentially speculative dialogue of languaging itself, Hermeneutic Constructivism is nonetheless reflexive to the possibility that people share experience.
8 However "sharing" here is not having the same experience. Instead, it is a process of envisioning the possibility of another person's experience, a possibility that will be emphasized further in later corollaries (see in particular Corollaries 5 and 7).
When considered in light of the prejudice, this corollary seeks to further amplify what it is that we actually language in coming to an understanding. As outlined, the prejudice provides the initial position from which we envisage the world. As well as this, the prejudice represents the possibilities of what can meaningfully come to understanding through its dynamic and essential relationship with authentic consciousness. The prejudice is, therefore, the essential precondition of the comportment of being, and as such is the essential structure that allows us to discriminate between people. That is, the prejudice is what makes you, you, and me, me, inherently unique people. Therefore the prejudice is the fundamental structure upon which people can be considered to differ. Finally, the inextricability of the prejudice from language is a reminder that we each develop an idiosyncratic system of prejudices from which to envisage the world; it is highly unlikely that two people would bring to bear an elaboration of their prejudices, and the connections that these prejudices make within their greater system of prejudices, in the same way. Thus, the ontological nature of the prejudice, together with the speculative conceptualization of language, provide grounds for suggesting that each person is fundamentally idiosyncratic in his or her comportment toward understanding.
6. Experience Corollary-To the extent that one languages an event of the world he or she can be said to have an experience.
Inherent within the Fundamental Postulate and the notion of languaging is a proactivity on the part of the person. The Experience Corollary extends this position by suggesting that experience is not simply a function of a person being present while the world goes by; experience is rather a function of a person's proactivity, a function of what the person makes of his or her presence within the world. Indeed, it is this evolution of an initial prejudice into a different prejudice that represents genuine experience per se. In such a conceptualization, experience is not considered in terms of an off/on modulation. Instead, it takes the form of degrees or depths of experience, determined by the extent to which a person languages an event. The more that we are able to engage with different aspects of our prejudice system in the dialogue of languaging, the more widespread the possible effect that the dialogue of languaging can have on our system of prejudices. The greater the effect on a person's prejudice(s), the greater the depth of experience that can be considered to have occurred. For Hermeneutic Constructivism, experience has an inherently productive and yet also negative quality. In languaging a thing to be understood, when we apprehend an aspect of that thing that is not already well anticipated by our prejudices, we are compelled by the comportment of being to develop that prejudice.
9 Thus, experience is here negative, given the recognition that an initial understanding is inadequate, while also productive in light of the possibilities opened up for the development of our understanding. Experience allows us to understand a thing better or differently and in so doing can change the way that we anticipate similar events in the future.
Passivity Corollary-A person is autonomous
with regard to being proactively inactive with regard to his or her languaging efforts.
It is clear that the person with whom Hermeneutic Constructivism concerns itself must also be considered to be equally proactive in his or her decision not to be proactive. In other words, although the comportment of being is always toward understanding-a process that has been outlined here as requiring an inherent proactivity on the part of person-this same person has the possibility of being proactively inactive. The Passivity Corollary is therefore reflexive of the way in which we each have the capacity to simply be, and to allow the happenings of the world to "wash over" us without having to make something of them. Invariably, however, the mode of an event may change a person's degree of proactivity. For example, a baby crying, a knock at the door, or the ring of a telephone, are some obvious examples that may indeed alter a person's degree of proactivity. Importantly, we always actively decide what we will be passive toward.
8. Sociality Corollary-To the extent that one person is able to share-through languaging about a thing to be understood-aspects of his or her horizon with another individual, that person is considered to have engaged in a social relationship.
At this juncture, one could be forgiven for believing that Hermeneutic Constructivism apprehends a theoretical conceptualization of the individual going about the business of being human without the presence of other like individuals. On the contrary-and remaining theoretically reflexive-going about the business of being human always involves other proactively languaging people. This corollary, however, establishes that simply being present within a world with other people does not represent a social relationship. Instead, a genuine social relationship is the sharing, between people, of aspect(s) of their "inner outlooks," a sharing of the way we each see the world. In a genuine social encounter, each individual person is provided an opportunity for his or her prejudices or understanding to be given more or less equal consideration within the to and fro dialogue about the subject matter of focus. Here, aspects of each individual person's prejudice system and the subsequent horizon of these prejudice(s) coalesce and in so doing create a social relationship. The Sociality Corollary thus locates the social relationship as this sharing of an aspect(s) of our system of prejudices with another person. Although languaging has been abstracted up to this point as a fundamentally inner activity of the person, the dialogical nature of languaging itself is not different when it goes on between people. In dialogue, a metaphorical space is created between two languaging people that provides an opportunity for a "languaging about" the thing that is or, rather, becomes the subject matter of the dialogue. Thus, in any genuine dialogue, this thing is placed-again metaphorically-within the space between people who are seeking to apprehend a better or different understanding of it. In a genuine dialogue, each person externalizes aspects of his or her prejudice system and concomitant horizon in the dialogue of languaging for consideration by the other person(s), inviting the other person to engage in a dialogue and to also externalize aspects of his or her inner outlook. If this exchange is a genuine dialogue, it will take the form of a to and fro movement of question and answer, where each interlocutor languages the prejudice(s) of the other person by asking questions and seeking answers to those questions. By way of a series of aha moments, these interlocutors reach agreement about the adequacy or satisfactory nature of the understanding that has arisen in the dialogue, to go on with the dialogue, or to cease it completely. It also follows that the more of a person's prejudice system brought into this to and fro dialogue, the greater the possibility of having those prejudices-and subsequent horizonsdeveloped by the dialogue itself.
From the position of theoretical reflexivity, we can note the many and varied situations in which we have engaged in a dialogue with another person, but which have not resulted in us coming to know more about that person or the subject matter of focus. Thus, it would be a philosophical faux pas to assume that this circular dialogue always results in one person understanding another person or the subject matter better than he or she did initially. Although each of us have borne witness to failed ventures of languaging about a thing to be understood with another person, it would be foolhardy to comprehend even these failed ventures as being less than a social relationship. Thus, for Hermeneutic Constructivism, the externalization of a person's languaging processes toward another person who acknowledges the invitation as such-as an externalization of one's languaging processes-is the basic requirement for a social relationship.
9. Similarity Corollary-To the extent that one person brings to language his or her system of prejudices in a manner comparable to that of another, his or her languaging processes can be considered similar to that of the other person.
In keeping with the principles of the Antithetical Corollary, it would be incommensurate to outline an Individuality Corollary (the fifth corollary)-encompassing the way by which people differ from each other-without a consideration also of the ways in which they can be considered similar. Hermeneutic Constructivism has emphasized the importance of gaining an appreciation not only of the words that are exteriorized but also of the connections these words make within authentic consciousness for the individual person. It is the elucidation of these connections between a person's prejudices and the broader meaning of these prejudices from authentic consciousness that represents most squarely the "inner outlook" of the individual person. The comportment toward understanding is conditioned by the prejudice which opens up the horizon or that aspect of authentic consciousness that operates to fill the prejudice with meaning. The nature of the prejudice as an essential structure of understanding and its elaboration from authentic consciousness provide fertile ground for apprehending the inner outlook of the individual person. In addition, the opening up of a person's horizon provides a productive means by which to make judgments concerning the degree to which that person can be considered similar to another. It is important to recognize here that a similarity between the prejudice(s) of two people is not to be confused as a similarity in languaged meaning. The speculative nature of language is a recognition that people could use the same words and yet mean vastly different things. In keeping with the Experience Corollary (the sixth corollary), it would be possible for two people to have the same experience and yet bring that experience to language in very different ways, and vice versa. Instead, for Hermeneutic Constructivism, a similarity in the languaging of a prejudice is merely recognition that two people can be considered similar with regard to their languaging processes.
The Similarity Corollary could thus also be considered a reminder that when a person brings his or her prejudice to language in a manner that is similar to another person, this is not necessarily that they carry similarity in meaning. Worded another way, a similarity between individual people on the basis of what is said is not necessarily a similarity of the meanings that lie behind their prejudices. Given the inherently dynamic and complex nature of prejudice systems, Hermeneutic Constructivism is skeptical of the likelihood that a similarity in the languaging of a prejudice would extend beyond one or two prejudices. Equally, it is possible that two people could develop the same meaning of an event and yet adopt a seemingly different series of prejudices. Thus, the extent to which two people bring their prejudices to language in a manner that is comparable supports a similarity in their languaging processes but not necessarily a similarity in experience. 10 10. Application Corollary-To the extent that an individual is able to apply the horizon of that which is other to the horizon of his or her own prejudice, he or she will have achieved a fusion of horizons.
It must be recalled at this point that Hermeneutic Constructivism takes the view that any understanding of a thing "in-itself" can never be complete or perfect. Instead, what can be achieved is an understanding of the thing as the way that the thing comes to understanding for us. Here, then, the understanding achieved of a thing is not different from the way in which we can bring that thing to language, as an understanding for us "thus-far." Understanding is therefore the product of our engagement in the dialogue of languaging, the to and fro movement between the horizon of the thing to be understood and the horizon that is provided by our prejudices. This itself is a reminder that each thing has its own horizon. However, recalling previous elaboration of the I-Thou relationship, the thing itself cannot engage in a dialogue and instead must be made to speak. Here, then, the dialogue that the thing is able to engage in is a function of the questions posed of it from the I, from us. In other words, the question posed determines the response that can meaningfully become an answer from the thing. For example, if one reaches toward the thing by way of the question "Is that round?" there is clearly only a finite range of answers that could be meaningful responses. Thus, the horizon of the thing can be considered as those answers that are meaningful possibilities to the question posed.
It is worth recalling too that each prejudice has a subsequent horizon that represents those aspects of authentic consciousness that a prejudice is able to provide access to. It is from within this horizon that the questions that sustain dialogue of languaging are developed. The horizon of each prejudice therefore represents the horizon of possible questions that can be posed of the thing. Thus, following Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 , when the horizon of the thing is able to answer the questions posed from the horizon of our prejudices, these horizons coalesce in a fusion of horizons. This fusion is a recognition that the questions posed of a thing are in fact legitimate because they are asked in such a way that the horizon of the thing is able to provide suitable answers. If this were to be the case for a person, the prejudice from which that person reached toward this thing in understanding would be considered suitable for understanding in this instance, given that it can open up toward further questions that are productive in the evolution of his or her prejudice(s).
The effectiveness of this anticipation is not to be confused with a complete or universal understanding in the form of an epistemological realism, or a one-to-one correspondence between a prejudice and thing. Instead, Gadamer's (1960 Gadamer's ( /2003 elucidation of the notion of application is rehabilitated here where a thing to be understood can always be understood differently if considered from a different perspective. Thus, in the case of Hermeneutic Constructivism, a thing to be understood always has the possibility of being understood differently, if envisioned from a different prejudice and its subsequent horizon. Thus, in light of the finite possibilities of human understanding and the fact that the moment a question is answered by the horizon of the thing further possibilities of questioning always arise, any fusion of horizons can never be complete. Reflexively, however, it is possible to understand something deeply. That is, the greater the extent of the fusion between the horizon of the thing and the horizon of our prejudices, the deeper our understanding is.
The Application Corollary thus suggests that we apply a prejudice to an event of understanding and allow that event to be illuminated and to come to understanding from the vantage point of that particular prejudice. Importantly, however, this illumination does not take the form of a searchlight simply seeking something out in the form of a correspondence between prejudice and thing. Instead, it is an illumination from within the event as a mode of being, an illumination from which all understanding has its origin and its possibilities and not its completion. Thus, the thing that is to be understood is illuminated by the light of the prejudice and comes to be understood in terms of a thing for us, as a thing that is not different from the way in which it is illuminated. It is, however, always possible for us to illuminate an event by the luminescent qualities of different prejudices and to understand that event differently as a function of the different illumination. Conceptualized in this way, understanding is not a perfection but, rather, always an application. It is the application of a prejudice to the situation at hand or an event of understanding, and it is that prejudice that determines the possibilities of the thing that can be understood. This notion of understanding as application carries with it an inherent productivity toward the ongoing development of a person's prejudices.
It has also been established that each of our prejudices carries a horizon that opens up the possibility of what can therefore become a question in the evolution of our prejudices and therefore understanding. It is the questions asked of the thing that therefore provide that thing with its own horizon, a horizon of possible answers to these questions. Thus, understanding always involves a coalescence of these horizons-the horizon of our prejudicesthat provides the possibilities of what can become a question, and the horizon of the other as the possible answers to these questions. In addition, this corollary sheds more light on the nature of this question and answer, to and fro movement of languaging. Given that every question stands in need of an answer and every answer is ultimately a response to a question, then what is occurring in languaging itself is a coalescence of the horizons. Here, the horizon of the prejudice that carries with it the possibilities of understanding, and therefore what can become a question, and the horizon of the other as the possible answers to that question, create a fusion. These horizons come together in a unity of agreement, which always, and at the same time, have aspects of separation between them. This separation represents aspects of disagreement and therefore the need for further questioning. Visualizing the way in which a spinning coin slows down upon a bench-top captures this constant state of flux between horizons. As the momentum of the coin diminishes, it begins to rotate in such a way that when the left side is up, the right side is down and vice versa, until such a time as it comes to a rest on the bench's surface. The point at which the surface of coin meets the surface of the bench is representative of agreement, while the opposite end not in contact with the bench represents aspects of disagreement and the possibility of further questioning. Most importantly, unlike the coin this is a dynamic movement that never comes to an end.
With the essential movement of this fusion considered, it is important to appreciate what this fusion actually means. Here, in the dialogue of languaging, we are able to recognize what it is that we already understand sufficiently about the thing, while we become aware of what it is that remains to be understood. It is this recognition of what is in doubt that conditions the questions posed. Therefore, when we pose questions of the thing, these questions are ultimately questions of what we already understand. In other words, these questions are of our own prejudices. Thus, in a fusion of horizons, our prejudices, and therefore our understanding, are developed through this coalescing of question and answer. The change in our prejudices that epitomizes understanding is an achievement brought about always by a fusion of horizons.
11. Temporal Distance Corollary-A person is able to continue the languaging of events following the event itself.
The Organization Corollary (the fourth corollary) established that it is not possible for a person to be situated outside of his or her prejudice system. As such, it is not possible for an individual to make discriminations about prejudices that result in understanding, from prejudices that result in misunderstanding. However, in being reflexive to the fact that at times we do indeed change our opinions of what has gone on at a previous moment in time, the Temporal Distance Corollary 11 suggests that it is possible for us to make these discriminations about our prejudices. In making something of the event in the unfolding of the event itself, we developed our prejudice(s) and henceforth had an experience. Therefore, it is this experience that a person is now relanguaging to understand it differently. In this movement of languaging, it is possible to envisage that experience from the perspective of different prejudice(s) and therefore continue to make something of it. It follows that if we make something of our experience, then we are actually developing further our prejudices and, as a result, are having a different experience. In so doing, we are able to filter prejudices that lead to adequate understanding from those that may lead to misunderstanding in the future. Finally, it must be emphasized that the development of understanding is never restricted to the time bound parameters of the original event of understanding.
Hermeneutic Constructivism: Theoretical Possibilities
The preceding theoretical elaboration of Hermeneutic Constructivism has established that the prejudice is the condition of our internal qualities of experience and that the human comportment itself is always toward understanding. Thus, an exploration of a person's prejudices is indeed a look at that person's inner outlook, that is, the way that he or she understands the world, as well as the possibilities that are available to this person in understanding the world differently. In accepting that language is the medium of being human, then, our understanding processes are inextricable from language also. Therefore, the prejudice itself and those aspects of authentic consciousness that the prejudice provides access to are all inextricable from language.
It follows that if the internal processes of understanding occur in language, then these processes can be brought to understanding for another person in that very same language. Worded another way, the person of Hermeneutic Constructivism can be articulate about his or her Self because the very structures that condition this Self are inextricable from language. In so doing, Hermeneutic Constructivism seeks to rehabilitate what Taylor (1985) referred to as the expressivist account of language (Taylor, 1985) . At the core of expressivist thought is the notion that language is disclosing of the world, and that it is the condition of all understanding, to the extent that meaning cannot be separated from the language that conditions it because meaning is only manifest in it. Thus, although it is a public language that we share, the carriage of meaning in language cannot be understood independently of another expression. Beginning with an expressivist foundation, Hermeneutic Constructivism reinstates the essential role of the dialogical encounter in coming to an understanding of another person.
Hermeneutic Constructivism supports interlocutors to engage in a dialogue where the researcher seeks an interpretation that effaces itself as an interpretation.
12 That is, the researcher accentuates those aspects of understanding that intersect with the participant and in so doing accents those aspects of the participant's inner outlook so adequately that it is not seen as an interpretation at all, and instead is recognized here in terms of what Gadamer (1985) -as cited in English by Grondin (2003) -describes as the mot juste, the most perfect word with which to capture the thing that is to be understood. Here, then, the aim of Hermeneutic Constructivism achieves its complete elaboration as a theoretical position that supports the search for the mot juste of the inner outlook of the participant, a level of abstraction that is consistent with the inherently unique and deeply nuanced individuals that we genuinely are.
Conclusion
This article has identified the possibility of a tension within qualitative research that on one hand recognizes that each individual has an inherently unique experience of the world and a seeking to represent that experience by way of a thematic representation foregrounded against a search for the common. We argued that the crux of the tension was a "slippage" between an expressivist and a designative account of the nature of language and the carriage meaning. The pervasive use of thematic analysis informed by designative assumptions about language and meaning-or something very much like it-operates to overlook the expressive nature of language in between experience and meaning. In so doing, it raises questions about the degree to which thematic approaches are able to provide a representation of individuals in a way that is consistent with the unique and deeply rich personal experiences shared in the research dialogue.
Conversely, by following Hermeneutic Constructivism, we are not dealing with utterance that is then turned into seemingly meaningful units; instead, we are dealing with a particularly high-level abstraction, the prejudice, the very condition of understanding for a particular individual. The prejudice is itself an ontological structure that represents the distillation of an individual's experiences across his or her life span. This ontological primacy of the prejudice and its uncovering and elaboration-by way of the mot juste-represents, we propose, a productive opportunity for developing a different model for qualitative research.
As, ultimately, the culmination of a person's historicity, the prejudice, as well as being a high order abstraction, is by its very nature an individual or unique structure. Remaining consistent with this and the speculative nature of language at the center of this expressivist account, any attempt to seek or find generalization or the common-in the form of a theme-would represent a philosophical faux pas. Instead, an approach to understanding that which arises from a genuinely expressivist tradition recognizes the multiplicity of meaning that can be embodied by a mot juste and in so doing makes the objective of research to set down the prejudice and its elaboration or contextualization by way of distilling the dialogical encounter that lead to the mot juste itself. Such a contextualization is not to be mistaken as an attempt to impose the researcher's understanding upon the text-thereby succumbing once again to a "slippage" toward designation-instead, it is an effort to recognize the speculative nature of language and to capture the circular dialogue that arrived at the mot juste so that another person is able to achieve a closer appreciation of the participant's experience. To facilitate the development of an approach that will enable the elucidation of another person's prejudices, a model is required that represents the dialogical movement of understanding that is implicit within the Hermeneutic Constructivist position. This is work that has already been undertaken by the authors.
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Notes
1. The authors wish to acknowledge the insightful comments received by way of the peer-review process, which have helped significantly in our refinement of this article. 2. Following the approach set by Kinsella (2006) , such an account is constitutively rooted in the hermeneutic tradition. As she has stressed, although hermeneutics was originally an interpretative approach used with specific reference to ancient and biblical texts, it has not only come to be applied to the human sciences more generally (Dilthey, 1910) , but also "is now seen by many to cover all interpretive acts in the human sciences" (Kinsella, 2006; cf. Rorty, 1991) . For Kinsella, this is an obvious connection because the hermeneutic focus on the "irremedially mediated processes of human understanding and interpretation" (Kinsella, 2006; cf. Sandywell, 1996) already underpins and facilitates the imperatives of qualitative research to engage more fully with human lived experience than is possible using quantitative approaches. A more explicit engagement of hermeneutic approaches and methods by qualitative researchers and research is both necessary and timely in Kinsella's eyes, and this article should be understood as a further contribution in this project.
3. Taylor (1985) refers to the expressive account as the H-H-H view of language, a shorthand reference to a period of German idealism underscored by the works of Hamann, Herder, and Humboldt. Importantly for this work, the H-H-H tradition informed the work of Heidegger's hermeneutics from which Gadamer took inspiration for his later work on language. 4. We acknowledge here the work of Chiari and Nuzzo (1996) who coined the phrase hermeneutic constructivism as a means of differentiating an ever-increasing array of theoretical approaches that share a proactive view of the human subject and that subsequently claim to come under the umbrella of constructivism. For these authors, hermeneutic constructivism opens up toward an overcoming of the subject/object divide by recognizing that operations of distinction in language constitute and validate reality. While homage is duly directed toward Chiari and Nuzzo for providing a sustained consideration of Kelly's work within a hermeneutic domain, they did not set for themselves the task of developing a fully fleshed ontological framework for understanding human being in the way we have here as Hermeneutic Constructivism. 5. Kelly's (1955) work provided the core principles that provided fertile ground from which to develop a framework for returning an idiographic and more deeply nuanced consideration of human being to qualitative inquiry. It has been shown elsewhere (Peck, 2015) , however, that tenuous links between the construct, world, and language raise questions about the claim to realism-that it is indeed the real world that a person discloses by way of his or her constructsthat can be made by Kelly's (1955) The Psychology of Personal Constructs and, more specifically, about the sustainable nature of the construct itself. These questions ultimately challenge the unabridged adoption of Kelly's (1955) approach as a theoretical position for informing qualitative research. Given that the core deficit that has been identified in Kelly's (1955) work was language, it is in the direction of language that an elaboration of Kelly's work was pursued. The hermeneutic work of Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 , and his account of the inextricability of language from being, provided a theoretical platform for reenvisioning Personal Construct Psychology. The product of this reenvisioning is Hermeneutic Constructivism. Taking a more sophisticated account of language as the basis for rehabilitating several core theoretical aspects of Kelly's (1955) work has provided a more sustainable claim to realism and the essential links between the world and the words and sentences uttered by the individual person. Indeed, the sustainability of these claims are of essential concern for qualitative research. The authors (Peck and Mummery) are in fact currently undertaking work exploring the claims to realism that can be made within contemporary approaches to qualitative research-in light of their pervasive adherence to thematic representation and the assumptions that underpin it. In contrast, Hermeneutic Constructivism rehabilitates Gadamer's (1960 Gadamer's ( /2003 ideas about the speculative nature of language and places the search for a prejudice-represented as the most perfect word or phrase by which to capture an interpretation of the experience being understood; a mot juste-and its elaboration or contextualization by way of distilling the dialogical encounter itself as the most central concern. Hermeneutic Constructivism therefore makes a turn in the direction of taking greater account of the nature of language and in so doing gives life back to the people who live it and open up an opportunity to raise understanding to a level of idiographic abstraction that is new to qualitative research. 6. Although Gadamer does not in his analysis of the I-Thou relationship explicitly refer to the work of Martin Buber, Buber's insights of the distinction between the I-Thou relationship and that of the I-It do of course underpin Gadamer's stressing of the importance of the I-Thou relationship. As Buber sees it, this distinction rests on the fact that while the I-Thou relation is always characterized by involvement, directness, openness, mutuality, and presentness, the I-It relation is one of distance, detachment, and instrumentality (see Buber, 1970 Buber, , 2002 . For both Buber and Gadamer, then, the Thou should never be treated as an object by and for the I, but always recognized as in a subject-to-subject relation. 7. A prime example of a core prejudice that might yield a high level of influence upon a person's greater system of prejudices is religion. For some the belief in a divine being and the will to follow a determined path of human existence significantly influences the way in which "everyday" or subordinate prejudices are developed. 8. This conceptualization of language as speculative is consistent with Gadamer's elucidation. In Truth and Method (Gadamer, 1960 (Gadamer, /2003 , by way of a section titled "Language as Horizon of a Hermeneutic Ontology," Gadamer suggests that although language is finite, in that there are ultimately a given number of words available for use, these words carry infinite meaning. It is upon this basis that the idiosyncratic position is being established here. 9. This notion is most consistent with Gadamer's (1960 Gadamer's ( /2003 elucidation of experience in Truth and Method (cf. the section titled "Analysis of Historically Effected Consciousness"). 10. It is important to establish that this is not a solipsism.
Hermeneutic Constructivism has suggested that the inextricable links between the prejudice, language, and understanding mean that a person can bring his or her understanding to language for another person. What is being suggested is that it would be unlikely for two people to have developed the same prejudices and even more unlikely that these same people have developed the same meaning. Importantly, this does not mean that two people cannot communicate with each other and share their view of the world while apprehending the other person's prejudices and his or her subsequent horizon. In fact, this reciprocity that is inherent within a dialogue operates to clearly and reflexively overcome solipsism. 11. The title, Temporal Distance Corollary, borrows heavily from the work of Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 who suggested that the passage of time provides the person with a productive opportunity for filtering his or her prejudices.
12. Here Hermeneutic Constructivism aligns strongly with Gadamer's (1960 Gadamer's ( /2003 elaboration of understanding, specifically his ideas of interpretation, application, and the fusion of horizons. For Gadamer, the fundamental comportment of each person toward understanding means that one reaches forward from the position of his or her own horizon by way of the application of initial prejudice. Through the movement of dialogue that follows the structure of question and answer, each person comes to a new or different understanding-an interpretation-of the thing that is to be understood. Importantly, interpretation is not merely what we superimpose upon a thing to be understood, instead, it is the application of an interpretation that is so effective that it is not seen as an interpretation and is instead "effaced" as being an interpretation at all. Thus, here an "interpretation must find the right language if it really wants to make a text speak" (Gadamer, 1960 (Gadamer, /2003 . What is right in an interpretation is therefore not what "is right" per se in an objective sense, but rather what is right as embodied by a "fusion of horizons." For Gadamer, understanding is a fusion of horizons. Here the horizon of the past-the person's Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein or historically effected consciousness-fuses or coalesces with the horizon of the present, or the thing to be understood in understanding. For Gadamer (1960 Gadamer ( /2003 , it is language that makes the fusion of horizons possible. In line with Gadamer's idea that language is fundamentally speculative in nature, it follows that this fusion of horizons is never complete as there are always ever different ways of bringing the world to understanding. The fundamental comportment toward understanding that Gadamer envisages can be elaborated further as an arriving at or toward the mot juste-the most perfect word or phrase for bring the world to understanding and the carriage of that understanding to another person.
